Labor Law by Wallace, Leon H.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 21 | Issue 3 Article 1
Spring 1946
Labor Law
Leon H. Wallace
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wallace, Leon H. (1946) "Labor Law," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 21: Iss. 3, Article 1.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol21/iss3/1
INDIANA
LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXI APRIL, 1946 Number 3
LABOR LAW
LEON H. WALLACE*
Without any attempt to make a comprehensive analysis,
an effort is made here to present a compilation of the more
important judicial decisions and laws affecting labor during
the period from June, 1940, with a brief background. Since
Acts of the Congress, and decisions of the federal judiciary
are a part of the la'w governing labor problems in Indiana in
a great many cases, a short review of the federal development
has been included. The rapid progress in parts of the field
of labor law during the period has made it difficult to state
with clarity the principles which seem to be emerging.
FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS: Judicial Consideration of
State Labor Law Cases.
The Supreme Court of the United States has considered
certain state statutes, and decisions of state courts from the
standpoint of whether such statutes or decisions conflicted
with the general public policy declared by Congress in the
Wagner Act.-
In the first of such cases considered, a union, its mem-
bers and officers had been ordered by the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, acting under Wisconsin law, to cease
mass picketing of an employer's place of business, picketing
of employees' homes, obstructing entrances, and threatening
personal injury or property damage to working employees.2
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A.,
secs. 151 et seq. (1940).
2. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
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The Supreme Court held that this did not conflict with the
policy of the -Wagner Act.
An Alabama Act was attacked in separate actions by
A.F. of L. and C.I.O. unions.3 The act requires all labor or-
ganizations to file copies of the constitution and by-laws of
both its local and national organization, forbids demand for
or receiving pay for work permits, requires filing of financial
reports annually, and forbids supervisory employees belong-
ing to a union. The Alabama Supreme Court upheld all the
provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court of the United States
denied writs of certiorari because a declaratory judgment
proceeding was not a proper, remedy under the issues.
The Florida legislature passed an act requiring licensing
of business agents of labor organizations. Such agent must
be of good moral character, must have been a citizen of the
United States for at least ten years, and must never have
been convicted of a felony. Labor unions were required
to file annual reports giving address of offices and names
and addresses of their officers and agents. In an injunction
suit brought by the Attorney General of Florida the union
involved was enjoined from acting as a labor union. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
sections of the act, heretofore summarized, conflicted with
the public policy expressed by the Congress in the Wagner
Act.4
The Supreme Court of the United States has also con-
sidered state statutes and decisions from the standpoint of
whether they violated due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
The majority of these cases involved picketing as an
incident of the right of freedom of speech. The Supreme
Court held in 1940 that a statute prohibiting picketing in
general was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by
restraining freedom of speech. 5 In 1941, the Supreme Court
reversed the New York court which had granted an injunc-
tion against the Teamsters Union for picketing bakeries using
3. Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450(1945). Congress of Industrial Organizations v. McAdory, 325
U.S. 472 (1945).
4. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, (1945). Stone, C. J., concurred
as to the licensing provisions. Frankfurter, J., and Robert, J.,
dissented.
5. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). See also American
Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
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independent truckers to sell their products to retailers, such
truckers being indepent contractors. 6 The reasoning followed
that of the Thornhill case. But on the same day, the Supreme
Court upheld an injunction decreed by a Texas Court under
a state anti-trust act against peaceful secondary picketing,
where union carpenters picketed the independent restaurant
premises, the owner of whicA was employing non-union labor
to build another building having no connection with the res-
taurant business.7 The Court distinguished between the two
cases by pointing out that in the Ritter case the relationship
of the cafe to the labor dispute was too remote. The Court
also held that an order of a state board enjoining picketing,
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin as not pro-
hibiting peaceful picketing, did not violate due process., In
two cases decided together in 1943,9 the Supreme Court re-
versed the New York Court, which had granted injunctions
against the union from picketing restaurants, operated by
their owners as partners without employees. A Texas stat-
ute, requiring paid labor organizers to register wit hthe Texas
Secretary of State before soliciting for members within the
state, was held to be invalid by the Supreme Court in a 5-4
decision. The majority opinion held that this act conflicted
with the right of free speech. 10 But a New Yorlk statute pro-
hibiting unions from denying membership or discriminating
between members on employment opportunity because of race,
color or creed, was unanimously upheld by the Supreme
Court."
The foregoing brief summary indicates that the decisions
of the Supreme Court have not clarified entirely the problem
6. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 of I.B. of Team-
sters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. (1942). Majority opinion by Jack-
son, J.; Douglas, J., joined by Black, J. and Murphy, J. join
in concurring opinion.
7. Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local 213 v. Ritter's
Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942). Majority opinion by Frankfurter, J.;
Reed, J.; dissenting in one opinion. Black, J. joined by Douglas
and Murphy, JJ., dissented in another opinion.
8. Hotel & Restaurant Employees International Alliance, Local 122
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 437 (1942).
Roberts, J., did not participate.
9. Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302, v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293,(1943).
10. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
11. Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 325 U.S. -, 65 Sup. Ct. 1483(1945).
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of which state acts concerning labor activities violate due
process.
Judicial Consideration of Cases Involving the Sherman Act,
the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
It is necessary to provide a brief background of certain
federal legislation in order to appreciate certain of the cases
which have been decided in recent years by the federal
judiciary.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act 12 provided that every con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy in restraint of commerce among the several states
or with foreign nations was illegal. Violations of the pro-
visions of the act were punishable by fine and imprisonment.
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden by the act was given a remedy in a civil
action and could recover treble damages.
In 1914 after long continued agitation, Congress passed
the Clayton Act." Section 6 of this act provided that the labor
of a human being was not a commodity or article of com-
merce; that nothing contained in the anti-trust laws should
be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor
organization instituted for the purpose of mutual help, or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, and
that such organizations or the members thereof should not be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade under the anti-trust laws. Section 20 of
the act forbade the granting of restraining orders or injunc-
tions by any court of the United States in any case between
employers and employees or persons seeking employment in-
volving or growing out of 9 dispute concerning terms or con-
ditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irrepar-
able injury to the applicant.
In 1932 in the light of the construction which had been
given the Clayton Act by the Supreme Court of the United
States, the Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act,14
which expressly denied jurisdiction to the courts of the United
12. Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647; 26 Stat. 209; 15 U.S.C.A., sec. 1 et seq.
13. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323; 38 Stat. 730; 15 U.S.C.A. sees. 12-27,
44; 18 U.S.C.A., sec. 412; 28 U.S.C.A. sees. 381, 383, 386-390a;
29 U.S.C.A. secs. 52, 53.
14 Act of March 23, 1932, c. 90; 47 Stat. 70; 29 U.S.C.A., sec. 101
et seq.
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States to grant relief by injunction in labor disputes, which
were enumerated with great particularity.
A major part of the labor law of the last generation re-
volves around the construction placed by the courts upon these
three acts and' in many cases the interplay of the acts as they
were applied to different fact situations. In 1908 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act applied to the activities of a labor union which restrains
interstate commerce by means of a boycott.1 5 After the pas-
sage of the Clayton Act the Court sustained the granting of
injunctive relief where the Court found that there had been
a violation of the Sherman: Act. 6 In the same year the Su-
preme Court reiterated this position."' The Supreme Court
during this period continued to find that the Sherman Act
applied to the activities of labor unions if those activities
restrained commerce under th facts and were intentionally
directed thereto. 8 This series of decisions eventually resulted
15. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 306 (1908). The ruling of the court
below sustaining a demurrer to the complaint seeking relief under
the Sherman Act, and alleging a boycott restraining trade was
reversed. A judgment for the plaintiff later was affirmed. Law-
lor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915). (Danbury Hatters Case.);
See also Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418
(1911).
16. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). In
the majority opinion, Pitney, J. observed "it (the Clayton Act) is
but declaratory of the law as it stood before." Brandeis, J., with
Holmes and Clarke, JJ., concurring, dissented.
17. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257
U. S. 184 (1921). Taft, J., in referring to See. 20 of the Clayton
Act said . . . this introduces no new principle into the equityjurisprudence of those (federal) courts. It is merely declaratory
of what was the best best practice always. Congress thought it
wise to stabilize this rule of action and render it uniform....
Each case must turn on its own circumstances. It in a case for the
flexible remedial power of a court of equity which may try one
mode of restraint, and if it fails or proves to be too drastic may
change it."
18. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U. S.
295 (1925). The Court had held previously in United Mine Workers
of America v. Coronado Coal Company, 259 U. S. 344 (1922) that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding of violation of
the Sherman Act, and had pointed out what evidence was lacking.
Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Associa-
tion, 274 U. S. 37 (1925). The Supreme Court upheld the granting
of an injunction against a labor union and its members on the
ground that their activities restrained trade in violation of the
Sherman Act. In a majority opinion by Sutherland, J., Sandford, J.,
and Stone, J., wrote separate concurring opinions. Brandeis, J., with
Holmes, J., concurring, dissented. See also Alco-Zander Company
v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 35 F. (2d) 203
(1929).
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in the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. However the
Supreme Court had consistently found that the Sherman Act
applied to the activities of labor unions and their members
when their strikes and boycotts intentionally interfered with
the shipment of the employer's product in interstate com-
merce.
In 1940 the Supreme Court, in an important opinion,
again considered the application of the Sherman Act to
striking employees. 10 This case involved the undisputed facts
that the members of the union, who were not employees of
the factory in question, seized the plant and declared a "sit-
down strike." Then acts of violence were committed and the
plant was held by the sit-down strikers for over six weeks.
Both manufacture and flow of petitioner's product into inter-
state commerce were stopped. The court found that the
activities affecting interstate commerce were not directed at
the control of the market, and were not so wide-spread as to
substantially affect it. In the opinion of the Court, these were
the necessary elements before the Sherman Act would apply
to such labor activities. Consequently, the Court found that
the Sherman Act had no application here. A comprehensive
review of the previous cases already cited was made in the
opinion. The Court ingeniously used the language of previous
opinions where the Court had found that the facts were in-
sufficient to constitute a violation of the Sherman Act, and
distinguished the facts of other prior cases where the Court
had found a violation. An actual comparison of the facts of
the various cases makes it apparent that the distinction, based
upon the assumption that the facts of the earlier cases were
substantially different, is questionable. In other words, the
Court in the Apex case stressed the language used in the
earlier cases denying application of the Sherman Act, and
stressed the facts which the Court had found in the earlier
cases in which it had held that there had been a violation.
The action of the Court in the Apex case, upon a comparison
of all the facts of the various cases, would seem to overrule
the Danbury Hatters case, the Duplex Printing Co. case, the
19. Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). The major-
ity opinion written by Stone, J., said "the prohibitions of the Sher-
man Act were not stated in terms of precision or of crystal clarity,
and the act itself did not define them. In consequence of the vague-
ness of its language, perhaps not uncalculated, the courts have beenleft to give content to the statute." A dissent was also written by
Hughes, J., in which McReynolds and Roberts, JJ., joined.
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Bedford Stone case, and the Second Coronado case, because
the same test which was applied to them would have brought
an opposite resulti had it been applied irq the Apex case. How-
ever, the Court declined to overrule them.
During the same year, the Supreme Court again con-
sidered the effect of the Sherman Act in a case which in-
volved criminal prosecution. 20 In this case, the members of
the Carpenters Union were in a dispute with the members
of the Machinists Union over which union had jurisdiction
of certain work in erecting and dismantling machinery for
Anheuser-Busch. Anheuser-Busch offered to submit the mat-
ter to arbitration in accordance with their agreement with the
carpenters but the carpenters refused, caused a strike, picket-
ed Anheuser-Busch, and requested through circular letters
that union members refrain from buying Anheuser-Busch
beer. The Court did not use the test which it had used in
the Apex case, but resurrected Section 20 of the Clayton Act,
redefined it in terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and found,
in the language of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, that "if the facts
laid in the indictment come within the conduct enumerated in
Section 20 of the Clayton Act, they would not constitute a
crime within the general terms of the Sherman Act because of
the explicit command of that section that such conduct shall
not be 'considered or held to be violations of any law of the
United States'." Mr. Justice Stone wrote a concurring
opinion. However, Mr. Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting
opinion, pointing out that by a unique process of construction,
the Court had found that because Congress forbade the is-
suance of injunctions to restrain certain conduct, it intended
to repeal the provisions of the Sherman Act authorizing ac-
tions at law and criminal prosecutions for the commission of
torts and crimes defined by the anti-trust laws. On the auth-
ority of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed judgments
sustaining demurrers to indictments under the Sherman Act
in a number of cases.211 But the Supreme Court has said that
where a labor union combines with others it may lose the
immunity which was given it by the decisions heretofore dis-
20. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941).
21. United States v. International Hod Carriers, 313 U. S. 539 (1941).
United States v. Brotherhood of Carpenters, 313 U. S. 539 (1941).
United States v. Trades Council, 313 U. S. 539 (1941). See also
United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 310 U. S. 741(1943). Cf. Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d)
349 (1941). Certiorari denied, 314 U.S. 615 (1942).
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cussed. Where the members of a union combined with con-
tractors and manufacturers for the purpose of putting pres-
sure on other contractors and manufacturers, or for the pur-
pose of excluding other contractors and manufacturers, the
Court held that the Sherman Act had been violated. How-
ever, the injunction, as approved, only covered combinations
with non-labor groups.22
However, on the same day the Court considered a case
where the members of a union had procured the company with
whom they had contracted to cancel its contracts with another
firm because employees of such other firm were non-union
employees. The union refused to permit such employees to
join the union and refused to negotiate with their employer.
As a consequence, the employer of th non-union men was
forced out of business by reason of a cancellation of its con-
tracts with the company, with whom the union had a contract.
The court here found no violation of the Sherman Act.2 3
Judicial Consideration Involving Cases Under the Anti-
Racketeering Act.
The Court also considered a criminal case for, conspiracy
to violate the Anti-Racketeering Act.24 Members of the de-
fendant union had halted truckers at the outskirts of New
York City and insisted on either furnishing drivers to carry
the load into the city and out again, or that the trucker pay
a member of the union the amount he would be entitled to
receive had he driven the truck.25 The Court found that the
Anti-Racketeering Act, which prohibited the use or threat
of force to obtain money except for the payment of wages
by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee, had not been
violated. The distinction made in the majority opinion is a
rather fine one.
22. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797 (1945).
Roberts, J., dissented in part and Murphy, J., thought the case
should be dismissed, since there would have been no violation had
the union acted alone, and should not be penalized because it had
procured aid of a non-labor group to further its own welfare.
23. Hunt et al v. Crumboch et al, 325 U. S. 821 (1945). Black, J.,
wrote the majority opinion. Jackson, J., dissented and said that
the ruling in this case could not be reconciled with that of the
Allen-Bradley case. Stone, C. J., and Frankfurter, J., joined in
this dissent. Roberts, J., also wrote a dissent in which Stone, C.J.,
Frankfurter, J., and Jackson, J., joined.
24. Act June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 979, 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 420 a.
25. U. S. v. Local Union No. 807, 315 U. S. 521 (1942).
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Judicial Consideration Involving Cases Under the Railway
Labor Act.
The Court found contracts of railway terminal com-
panies with redcaps were not in conflict with the collective
bargaining conditions of the Railway Labor Act.26 Two years
later the Court adopted a policy of exclusive bargaining rights
in the case of Orderi of Railway Telegraphers v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, Ine.2 7 The reasoning in the Railway Telegraph-
ers case seems contradictory to that of the Williams case.
The Court also held that the Railway Labor Act created a
duty on the part of a union acting as bargaining representa-
tive not to discriminate among employees because of race .2
The Court also held that disputes between railway unions
could not be litigated under the Act.2 9
Judicial Consideration of Cases Under the National Labor
Relations Act.
The cases arising under the National Labor Relations
Act 0 comprise more than half of the labor cases which have
been decided by the Supreme Court in the period covered
herein. Section 7 of the act, known also as the Wagner Act,
provides that employees shall have the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining, or other mutual aid or protection. Section
8 of the act defines five unfair labor practices for an em-
26. Williams v. Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386 (1942).
27. 321 U. S. 342 (1944).
28. Steele v. L. & N. R. R., 323 U. S. 192, (1944). Tunstall v. Brother-
hood, 323 U. S. 210 (1944). The Court held, however, that the
dispute involved here was not one to be decided under the Railway
Labor Act.
29. Switehmens Union v. National Mediators Board, 320 U. S. 297(1943); General Committee v. M. K. T. R. R. Co., 320 U. S. 323
1943); General Committee v. S. P. R. R. Co., 320 U. S. 338 (1943).
Reed and Roberts, JJ., dissented in all three cases, Jackson, J., in
the first case.
30. Act of July, 1935, Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C.A., Sec. 151 et
seq. This act empowered the Board created thereunder to prevent
and person from engaging in an unfair labor practice affecting
commerce. Commerce is defined to mean trade, traffic, commerce,
etc., among the several states or between any foreign country and
any state. Sec. 2, Subsection 6. The Court has held the Act applic-
able to interstate insurance business, Polish National Alliance v.
N.L.R.B., 322, U. S. 643 (1944), which is interstate commerce.
U. S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
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ployer: (1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7, (2) to dom-
inate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other sup-
port to it, (3) to discriminate in regard to hire and tenure
of employment, or any term or condition of employment, or
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organ-
ization, (4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against
an employee because he has filed complaint or given testimony
under the act, and (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representative of his employees. The constitutionality of
the act was upheld by, the Court in 1937.31
Interference, restraint and coercion. In N.L.R.B. v. Ford
Motor Co.,3 2 violence by company employees against members
of the union was held to be an unfair labor practice. How-
ever, the Court also found that publications by Ford Motor
Company urging the, men to ignore the union was not an un-
fair labor practice. The finding of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was not disturbed by the Supreme Court. Here the co-
ercive effect of the employer's language was balanced against
his right of freedom of speech, and freedom of speech was
allowed to prevail. However, in another case,3 3 the Circuit
Court of Appeals had found that the printed statement of
the employer to his employees that. they were under no obliga-
tion to join a union was an unfair labor practice, and the
Supreme Court declined to disturb this finding although the
Board expressly called it to the attention of the Supreme
Court that this case was in conflict with the finding in the
Ford case and asked that the free speech question be reviewed.
The Supreme Court declined. Spying and espionage by an
employer has been held to be an unfair labor practice, under
Section 8 (1) of the Act.34 A profit-sharing contract, no mat-
ter how favorable to the employees, has been held to consti-
tute an unfair labor practice where it bound the employee to
31. N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1(1936).
32. 114 Fed. (2d) 905, (CCA6) (1940), certiorari denied, 312 U. S. 689(1941).
33. N.L.R.B. v. Elkland Leather Company, 114 Fed. (2d) 221, (CCA3)(1910), certiorari denied, 311 U. S. 705 (1940).
34. Montgomery-Ward and Co. v. N.L.R.B., 115 Fed. (2d) 700, (CCA8)(1940). N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, 306, U. S.
240 (1939).
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remain at work for a period of two years. 5 Individual con-
tracts with employees which obstruct unionization have been
held to be an unfair labor practice.38 Likewise, the urging of
employees to bargain directly with the employer, coupled with
the formation of an independent union, has been found to be
an unfair labor practice, both as to interference with the
rights of collective bargaining and as to the domination of the
labor organization.3 7
In a recent case the Court held that the announcement
by an employer that it was asking authority to grant a, wage
increase was an unfair labor practice when made directly
to the employees, and not to the bargaining representative. 38
In two cases in 1945, decided in a single opinion, the
Supreme Court upheld a finding of the Board that an em-
ployer's order which prohibited union solicitation on com-
pany property was an unreasonable interference with the
rights of the employees. The employer's rule applied to non-
working hours.39
Domination and Interference with the Formation and
Administration of Labor Organizations. In the Virginia
Electric and Power Company case discussed in the preced-
ing section, the Court upheld the finding of the Board
of an interference, with the formation of the independ-
ent union involved.40  The power of the Board to make
an order of disestablishment of such a union, dominated
35. N.L.R.B. v. Jahn and Ollier Engraving Company, 123 Fed., (2d)
589, (CCA7) (1941).
36. National Licorice Co. v. N.L.R.B., 309 U. S. 350 (1940).
37. Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., 319 U, S. 533 (1943).
This case had been remanded by the Supreme Court for the finding
of further facts before the court would sustain the finding of the
Board. N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Electric and Power Company, 314
U. S. 469 (1941). The evidence in the case as shown by the record
in 1941 merely shows the bulletin and two speeches of company of-
ficers standing alone and it might be inferred that the Court be-
lieved that the finding of the Board based on this evidence alone
might be an interference with the employer's right of free speech.
38. May Department Stores Company v. N.L.R.B., - U. S. - ,
66 Sup. Ct. 203 (1945). The majority opinion upheld a finding
of a violation of both Sec. 8 (1) and (5). In an opinion concurring
in part, Rutledge, J., believed that the finding of violation as to
Section 8 (1) should be eliminated and that the only violation was
a refusal to bargain collectively with the bargaining agent. Stone,
C.J., and Frankfurter, J., joined in this opinion.
39. Republic Aviation Corporation v. N.L.R.B. v. Le Tourneau Co., 324,
U. S. 793 (1945).
40. Virginia Electric and Power Co. vs. N.L.R.B., 319 U. S. 533 (1943).
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by the employer, has been upheld.41  Even'though the em-
ployer has taken no part in the formation of a union, his
expression of preference for it may constitute an unfair labor
practice, which will be the basis of an order of disestablish-
ment.42  The employer has been held to be responsible for
the activities of his supervisory employees in promoting the
interests of a certain union, even though the employer had
not authorized the supervisors to do so.4 3 Where the Board
finds company demonation, it orders the employer to dis-
establish the dominated union, which has been given notice
of the proceedings, and is a party.44 The Court also found
that an employer had been guilty of an unfair labor practice
when the employer offered the employees a wage increase if
they would abandon the union.4 5
Discrimination. The discharge of an employee be-
cause of his union affiliation, even though there may be valid
other reasons for such discharge, has been held to constitute
an unfair labor practice.46 If there is any substantial evidence
to support the finding of the Board, the Court will not disturb
an order of the Board.47 However, the Supreme Court has held
that even though there were unfair labor practices indulged in
by the employers, including discrimination, an order of the
Board reinstating the men with back pay will not be upheld
in the case of seamen actively employed in the operation of
ships.48 The Court has also upheld the Board in making an
order to instate applicants for employment who were not
41. N.L.R.B. v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584 (1941). In Humble Oil
and Refining Co. v. N.L.R.B., 113 Fed. (2d) 85, C.C.A.5 (1940),
the Circuit Court of Appeals refused to uphold the finding of the
Board that a new independent union was company dominated, but
in N.L.R.B. v. American Potash and Chemical Corporation, 98
Fed. (2d) 488, (CCA9) (1938) certiorari denied 306 U. S. 643
(1939), the finding of company domination by the Board was up-
held. See also American Enka Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 119 Fed.(2d) 60, (CCA4) (1941).
42. Valley Mould and Iron Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 116 Fed. (2d) 760,(CCA7) (1940), certiorari denied 313 U. S. 590 (1941).
43. Heinz Company v. N.L.R.B., 311 U. S. 584 (1941). See also Inter-
national Association of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 311 U. S. 72 (1940).
44. N.L.R.B. v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 319 U. S.
50 (1943).
45. Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 321 U. S. 678 (1944).
46. N.L.R.B. v. Arcade-Sunshine Co., 118 Fed. (2d) 49, (U.S.C.A.-D.C.)
(1940), certorari denied, 311 U. S. 567 (1940).
47. N.L.R.B. v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corporation, 315 U. S.
789 (1942).
48. Southern Steamship Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U. S. 31 (1942).
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employed because of their labor affiliations, and upheld an
order that they should be paid what they would have earned,
unless they had obtained other and substantially equivalent
employment. 49  The Court also upheld the finding of the
Board of unfair labor practice where an employer had pro-
cured employees to join a union with which he had a con-
tract not providing for a closed shop. The making of a closed
shop contract with this union was found to be a further vio-
labor of Section 8 (3).50 Where an employer had been charged
by certain employees of sponsoring an independent union,
and subsequently all the parties had agreed for the Board
to hold an election which was won by Independent, which
then entered into a closed shop contract with the employer,
refused to admit the employees who had complained in the
first instance, and demanded and obtained their discharge,
the Court upheld a finding of the Board that the discharge
of the men was an unfair labor practice.51 The theory of
the finding was that the company should have anticipated
the demand and discharges. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice
Roberts and Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in a dissenting
opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson. However, the Court refused
to permit the Board to vacate a part of its decree where
by reason of later facts found, the Board believed that it had
not ordered enough back pay for workers discriminated
against.52
Collective Bargaining. The Supreme Court has upheld
the order of the Board in ordering an employer to bargain
with the union which no longer represents a majority, but
which had represented a majority at the time the employer
refused to bargain with it. 53 Merely pretended bargaining is
49. Phelps-Dodge Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 313 U. S. 177 (1941).
Stone, J., dissented in the construction placed on the act that the
Board was authorized to order the employer to hire applicants for
work who had never been in his employ, and to compel him to give
them back pay, contending that the order should have been limited
to an order to cease and desist from the practice in the future.
50. N.L.R.B. v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U. S. 685 (1942).
51. Wallace Corporation v. N.L.R.B. 323 U. S. 248 (1944).
52. Frank Bros. Company v. N.L.R.B., 321 U. S. 702 (1944). In South-
port Petroleum Co. v. N.L.R.B., 315 U. S. 100 (1942), the Court
held an application for leave to introduce additional evidence before
the Board, addressed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, would be
acted on by the Court in its sound discretion.
53. International Union v. Eagle-Picher Mining and Smelting Co., 325
U. S. 335 (1945). In J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U. S. 332 (1944),
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not enough.5' The employer who has failed to comply with
an order to bargain must comply, even though he is assured
that the bargaining agent no longer represents the majority2 5
The Court has also upheld the Board that its orders may be
binding on the successors and assigns of an employer. 8 In
1944, the Supreme Court upheld a finding of the Board that
newspaper carriers were employees and being such were -en-
titled to the rights conferred in connection with collective
bargaining."
WAR AND POST WAR LEGISLATION.
The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. In 1940,
the Congress enacted the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940.58 Under Section 8 of the Act, any person inducted
into the land or naval forces, upon application within forty
days after his discharge, may apply for re-employment in
the position or job he left upon his induction, if he is still
qualified to perform the duties of such position, or unless
the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make
it impossible or unreasonable. This is mandatory on the
United States Government, its Territories or possessions, or
the District of Columbia, and on private employers. The
policy is also recommended by the Congress to the States and
subdivisions thereof. In case of refusal by any employer,
the United States district attorney in the appropriate district
is charged with the duty of acting as attorney for the dis-
charged veteran, either in making an amicable settlement,
or in the filing of any appropriate motion, petition or plead-
ing, and the prosecution thereof, in the appropriate District
Court of the United States, to specifically require such em-
ployer to comply with the provisions of the Act. The Di-
employer, when union had not represented majority of employees,
made one year individual contracts with majority. Before contracts
expired Union was certified as representing majority, and em-
ployer refused to bargain, relying on the individual contracts. The
Court upheld the Board's order to bargain.
54. N.L.R.B. v. Ross Manufacturing Co., 118 Fed. (2d) 187 (CCA 7)(1941). N.L.R.B. v. Pilling & Son Company, 119 Fed. (2d) 32
CCA 8) (1941).
55. N.L.R.B. v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U. S. 512 (1942).
56. Regal Knitwear Company v. N.L.R.B., 324 U. S. 9 (1945).
57. N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944).
58. Act September 16, 1940, c. 720, 54 Stat. 885; 50 U.S.C.A., App.
Sees. 301 et seq.
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rector of Selective Service is also charged with the duty of
establishing a Personnel Division with adequate facilities
to give aid to veterans in replacement in their former posi-
tions, or in securing new positions for them.
It has been held that an action for wages may be main-
tained by the veteran in the appropriate court for the wages
which he would have earned after he should have been re-
employed1 The Court also found that the provisions of
the section were not unconstitutional because of the vague-
ness or uncertainty of the word "impossible" or "unreason-
able" as used in the act in reference to excusing re-employ-
ment.
However, the provisions of the section have been held
not to require the payment of wages, or group insurance
premiums, of an employee after he quits his employment and
during the period he awaited induction. 60
It is the opinion of the Attorney General of the United
States that civil service "war appointees" are not entitled
to restoration to such civil positions after they have com-
pleted military service.6 L
In view of the duties imposed on the several District
Attorneys, it is probable that the practicing attorney is con-
cerned with the provisions of this section of the Act only in
advising honorably discharged veterans of their rights, and
in defending employers in actions instituted under the section.
This Act also extends to all persons inducted into the
land or naval services the benefits of the Soldiers and Sailors
Civil Relief Act of 1918,62 which was substantially re-enacted
as the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940, as sub-
sequently amended.62
The War Labor Disputes Act. In 1943, the Congress
enacted the War Labor Disputes Act.64 This act provided
procedure for the settlement of disputes, and for seizure of
industrial facilities by the President, with governmental op-
59. Hall v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 53 Fed. Supp. 817(D.C. Ky.) (1944).
60. Murphy v. Chrysler Corp., 306 Mich. 610, 11 N. W. (2d) 261 (1943).
61. 40 Op. Atty. Gen.-, 1943.
62. Act March 6, 1918, 40 Stat. 440; 50 U.S.C.A., App. Secs. 101-165.
63. Act October 17, 1940, c. 888, 54 Stat. 1178; 50 U.S.C.A., App. Sec.
501 et seq.
64. Act June 25, 1943, c. 144, 57 Stat. 163; 50 U.S.C.A., App. Sec. 1501
et seq. (Smith Connally Anti-Strike Act.)
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eration of such facilities. Provision was made for the giving
of notice by employees anticipating strike action, and the
taking of a vote among the employees involved on the ques-
tion of striking after a thirty day period. There is pending
proposed legislation which, if enacted, would repeal the act.
However, the power of seizure and operation still exists.
The Stabilization Act of 1942. Under the provisions of
the Stabilization Act of 1942,65 which will be terminated,
unless extended, on or before June 30, 1946, the President is
empowered to stabilize wages and salaries affecting the cost
of living, and may provide for making adjustments in wages
and salaries to the extent that he finds necessary to correct
gross inequities. Most of the administrative procedure and
regulation created under the act, and operative during the
war years, have been abandoned since the surrender of Japan,
but the power still exists.
INDIANA DEVELOPMENTS
JUDICIAL DECISIONS. In 1939, the Supreme Court of
Indiana had considered a case where an outside union sought
to compel an employer to sign a closed'shop contract, where-
by his employees would be compelled to join the union. The
Court held that lawful picketing by a labor union cannot
be utilized to accomplish an unlawful purpose.6  However,
in 1941,67 the Supreme Court of Indiana held that picketing
of mines by union men who were not employees of the mine,
when conducted peacefully, could not be enjoined, and to
do so was a denial of the right of free speech. The Court
cited Milk-wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287, 61 Sup. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836, 136 A.L.R. 1200
(1941); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S.
321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1941); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 312 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940) ;
and Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857,
81 L. Ed. 1229 (1937). The Court obviously believed that
the cited cases required it to overrule the Roth case. In 1943,
the Court again ruled that picketing by an outside union in
65. Act October, 2, 1942, c. 578, 56 Stat. 765; 50 U.S.C.A., App. Secs.
961 et seq.
66. Roth v. Local Union No. 1360, 216 Ind. 363, 24 N. E. (2d) 280
(1939), and cases cited.
67. Davis v. Yates, 218 Ind. 364, 32 N.E. (2d) 86 (1941).
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an effort to unionize the employees of the picketed employer
could not be enjoined because of the right of free speech.68
The Court has also held that the Indiana courts have
jurisdiction to enjoin the breach of a contract between an
employer and a labor union where the employees were parties
and the union was not a party, but that a court of equity
would not decree specific performance of the agreement in
the contract to submit to arbitration of damages for breach
of the contract.69
In 1944, the Indiana Supreme Court found that the
refusal, of an oil company to sell gasoline to a union member
who was violating a union rule concerning closing hours was
not a part of a combination in restraint of trade in violation
of law,70 because the refusal was not by reason of the fact
that the person seeking relief was not a member of the "com-
bination or association," but because of the violation of rules
by the member. The Court also affirmed the right of the
union to peacefully picket the premises, since no fraud or
violence was involved.7 1
The Indiana Supreme Court has also held that the courts
will not interfere with a reasonable interpretation of the
rules and regulations of a trade union by its officers, so
long as such interpretation does not amount to regulation of
or control generally the public policy expressed "by the laws
of the land." 72
ADMINISTRATIVE OPINIONS. In an opinion of the
Attorney General, no law prevents governmental employees
from joining a trade union. However, there is no authoriza-
tion in any statute for collective bargaining between a gov-
ernmental unit and its employees, or for collective bargaining
between a governmental unit and a union,73 if the agreement
growing out of such negotiations be construed as a contract,
on the theory that a member of the union authorizes his
agents, the union officers, to enter into a contract binding
68. Local Union No. 1460, Retail Clerks Union v. Peaker, 222 Ind.
209, 51 N.E. (2d) 628 (1943).
69. Janalene Inc. et al v. Burnett, 220 Ind. 253, 41 N. E. (2d) 942
(1942).
70. Ind. Stat. Ann., 1933, Sec. 23-107 Burns.
71. Cass v. Continental Oil Co., 222 Ind. 224, 52 N.E. (2d) 614 (1944).
72. Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co. v. Miller, 219 Ind. 389. 38 N. E.
(2d) 239 (1942).
73. Op. Atty Gen., 1944, p. 224.
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on the individual members of the union, for their own bene-
fit, and also for the benefit of third parties who might sub-
sequently become members of the union. Where merit or
civil service provisions are mandatory, as in the State Per-
sonnel Act, or in cases where competition is required, such
a possibility is precluded. It is the opinion of the Attorney
General that until the legislature specifically provides for
the making of such agreements, they would be ultre vires
and of no legal force.
LEGISLATION.
A 1941 act 74 amends previous legislation and provides the
terms and conditions for the hiring of miners, and the ex-
ceptions to such hire. A 1943 act"5 exempts operators of mines,
quarries, or manufacturing plants owned by the United
Staes, or any agency thereof, from filing bond with the Clerk
of the Circuit Court to insure the payment of wages of em-
ployees. Another 1943 act Te confers upon the employees of
strip coal mines a miner's lien for wages. Legislation has
also been enacted 77 providing for the posting of a no-lien
contract, if laborers are not to have a lien on the real estate
on which work is done. Two 1945 acts both purport to amend
a 1943 act 7 8 concerning the employment of girls. The 1943
act provided for maximum hours of work for boys and girls
between 16 and 18 years of age with an eight hour day and
six day week, except those engaged in farm labor, or domes-
tice service, or as pin boys in bowling alleys or newspaper
carriers and that, aside from those exceptions, none should
be employed prior to 6:00 A.M. or after 7:00 P.M. Acts 1945,
Ch. 31, p. 52 amending the 1943 Act, authorized the employ-
ment of girls between the ages of 16 and 18 until 10:00 P.M.
This act was approved February 20, 1945, and carried no
emergency clause. Acts 1945, Ch. 314, p. 1391, amending the
same section, created substantially the same authorization.
Chapter 314 had an emergency clause and took effect March
7, 1945. Under the decision of Metsker v. Whitsell, 181 Ind.
126, 103 N.E. 1078 (1914), the Supreme Court under similar
74. Acts 1941, Ch. 51, Ind. Stat. Ann., 1943 Supp., Sec. 28-518 et seq.
Burns.
75. Acts 1943, Ch. 180, Ind. Stat. Ann., 1943 Supp., Sec. 40-112 Burns.
76. Acts 1943, Ch. 246, Ind. Stat. Ann., 1943 Supp., Sec. 46-1514 Burns.
77. Acts 1943, Ch. 187, Ind. Stat. Ann., 1943 Supp., Sec. 43-701 Burns.
78. Acts 1943, Ch. 155, Ind. Stat. Ann., 1943 Supp., See. 28-521 n.
Burns.
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facts established a rule which would require that Ch. 314
be enforced and Ch. 31 not be enforced. Another 1945 act
suspended all laws respecting days and hours within which
women may be employed for the duration of the war or the
duration of the contract made by any industry producing
materials, or equipment, or rendering service in aid of the
war program, but not beyond March 15, 1947.79 All such
laws were retroactively suspended to December 7, 1941.
An act of 194180 provides for the payment by an em-
ployer of earnings of deceased employees, up to $150.00,
to designated next of dn, without administration.
In 1941 comprehensive amendments were made to the
Indiana Employment Security Act,8' relating to benefits,
claims, contributions, and the rights and benefits of those
entering military service. Again in 1943, the Act was ex-
tensively amended."- In 1945, additional amendments were
made3
In 1941, a State Personnel Merit System was created,84
providing an employment system resembling civil service.
Provision was made to extend the benefits of the Act to
employees of political subdivisions of the State. In 1943,85
sections 4 and 5 of the original act, creating a Board and
the office of Director, were repealed, and new provision made
therefor. Additional amendments were made in 1945,88 in
which veterans were given preference.
In 1943 the Workmen's Occupational Disease Act8 was
amended, and rates of compensation changed,88 in case of the
death of the employee. Burial benefits were provided.
79. Acts 1945, Ch. 23, p. 39.
80. Acts 1941, Ch. 184, p. 555; Ind. Stat. An., 1948 Supp., Sec. 6-1514
Burns.
81. Acts 1941, Ch. 277, p. 735; Ind. Stat. Ann. 1943 Supp. Secs. 52-1502
to 52-1508; 52-1510 to52-1518, 52-1520 to 52-1523, all inc. Burns.
82. Acts 1943, Ch. 286, p. 805; Ind. Stat. Ann. 1943 Supp. Secs. 52-1502
to 52-1510; 52-1514 to 52-1520, all mc. Burns.
83. Acts 1945, Ch. 315, p. 1393, amending Ind. Stat. Ann. 1943 Supp.,
Sees. 52-1512 to 52-1514, inc., Burns.
84. Acts 1941, Ch. 139, p. 387; Ind. Stat. Ann. 1943 Supp., Sec. 60-1301
et seq.
85. Acts 1943, Ch. 101, p. 304; Ind. Stat. Ann. 1943 Supp., Secs. 60-
1304; 60-1305 Burns.
86. Acts 1945, Ch. 287, p. 1266, amending Ind. Stat. Ann., 1943 Supp.,
Secs. 60-1313; 60-1324; Acts 1945, Ch. 153, p. 354, amending Ind.
Stat. Ann. 1943 Supp., Sec 60-1319 Burns.
87. Ind. Stat. Ann. 1940 Repl. Sec. 40-2201 et seq. Burns.
88. Acts 1943, Ch. 115, p. 364, amending Ind. Stat. Ann. 1943 Supp.,
Secs. 40-2207; 40-2211 Burns.
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Two important amendments from the viewpoint of labor
were made to the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1945.
The first", increased the compensation payments for medical
and hospital care, and provided for the division of compen-
sation into shares for the dependents of a deceased employee,
and for payment to partial dependents. The second 0 pro-
vided that the employer cannot be relieved of his obligation
under the act by any contract, rule, regulation or device.
The status of an employee receiving a permanent injury
after a previous permanent injury, or the aggravation of a
previous injury, is clarified.
In 1945 the legislature enacted what may be termed a
fair employment practice act.91 The act set out the policy
of the state against discrimination, a comprehensive list of
definitions, gave the commissioner of labor the power to ap-
point employees to carry out the purpose of the act, and
the power to assist in bringing about the removal of discrim-
ination in regard to hire or tenure, or terms or conditions
of employment because of race, creed, or color. The act or-
dered the commissioner to make a study and to report to
the legislature, authorized him to receive and investigate
complaints of discrimination, created an advisory board of
nine members to advise him, and provided no remedy what-
soever if discrimination is found.
89. Acts 1945, Ch. 188, p. 580, amending Ind. Stat. Ann. 1940 Repl.
Sees. 40-1213; 40-1225; 40-1227; 40-1401; 40-1402; and 40-1405
Burns.
90. Acts 1945, Ch. 284, p. 1261, amending Ind. Stat. Ann. 1940 Repl.
Sees. 40-1215; 40-1305 Burns.
91. Acts 1945, Ch. 325, p. 1499.
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